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Abstract
We study the inﬂation uncertainty reported by individual forecasters in the Sur-
vey of Professional Forecasters 1969-2001. Three popular measures of uncertainty
built from survey data are analyzed in the context of models for forecasting and asset
pricing, and improved estimation methods are suggested. Popular time series mod-
els are evaluated for their ability to reproduce survey measures of uncertainty. The
results show that disagreement is a better proxy of inﬂation uncertainty than what
previous literature has indicated, and that forecasters underestimate inﬂation uncer-
tainty. We obtain similar results for output growth uncertainty.
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11 Introduction
Modern economic theory predicts that agents’ behavior depends on their assessment of
the probabilistic distribution of future economic data. It is only under very restrictive
assumptions that the point forecast is sufﬁcient to characterize their choices. In general,
higher moments also matter. This paper focuses on inﬂation uncertainty as measured by
the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) since the late 1960s. It also studies the real
GDP growth uncertainty from the same survey, which is only available since the early
1980s.
The most common way to assess forecast uncertainty is by estimating some kind of
timeseriesmodel. Thereareseveralsituationswhensurveydataonexpectations/uncertainty
are preferable to time series models, for instance, when
- a series has recently undergone a structural change, for example, the adoption of an
inﬂation target;
- different time series methods disagree and it is difﬁcult to point out the best method;
- whenever an empirical rather than a normative measure of uncertainty is needed, so
that the interest focuses on actual agents’ expectations.
As an example, consider Sargent’s (1993) claim that a policy of reducing the inﬂation
rate need not cause any output loss—provided the change in regime is credible. To be
made operational, the claim needs a measure of credibility. One way to assess credibility
is then to consider the mean and width of agents’ forecast error bands. As another exam-
ple, forecast error bands make it possible to evaluate the credibility of inﬂation targets,
including the tolerance intervals, used by many central banks. In such circumstances a
survey measure of uncertainty has clear advantages over an econometric estimate. If a
change in regime is suspected, these advantages are magniﬁed.
But even if having a measure of uncertainty from survey data is often desirable, there
is no clear, uncontroversial, way of extracting such a measure. A main concern of the
paper is to show the conceptual and practical importance of how the survey data is used.
The ﬁrst issue we discuss is how to think about inﬂation and GDP growth uncertainty
when every forecaster reports his own perceived uncertainty, but also disagrees with other
forecasters on the point forecast. We use a simple theoretical framework to highlight that
2the relevant deﬁnition of uncertainty depends on its intended use. For example, we main-
tain that previous ﬁndings (Diebold, Tay, and Wallis, 1998) that forecasters overestimate
inﬂation uncertainty are based on an inappropriate deﬁnition of uncertainty, and that the
conclusion ought to be reversed.
The second issue we discuss is how uncertainty can be estimated from the individual
answers. Usingimproved(morerobust)estimationtechniques, weconcludethatdisagree-
ment on the point forecast, a readily available but (at present) theoretically unfounded
measure of uncertainty, is a better proxy for more theoretically appealing measures than
previously thought (Zarnowitz and Lambros, 1987). We also show that recent forecast-
ing errors have stronger effects on perceived uncertainty (as in an ARCH model) than
found in previous studies (Ivanova and Lahiri, 2000), and that a whole range of different
time series models all fail to keep up with regime changes in U.S. inﬂation uncertainty
(especially in the early 1980s).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the data in the Survey
of Professional Forecasters. Section 3 discusses alternative measures of uncertainty from
the survey data. Section 4 discusses the estimation of uncertainty. Section 5 presents the
empirical results, and Section 6 concludes.
2 The Survey of Professional Forecasters
The data used in this paper are from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF), which
is a quarterly survey of forecasters’ views on key economic variables. The respondents,
who supply anonymous answers, are professional forecasters from the business and ﬁnan-
cial community. The survey was started in 1968 by Victor Zarnowitz and others of the
American Statistical Association and National Bureau of Economic Research. The num-
ber of forecasters was then around 60, but decreased in two major steps in the mid 1970s
and mid 1980s to as low as 14 forecasters in 1990. The survey was then taken over by the
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia and the number of forecasters stabilized around 30.
See Croushore (1993) for details.
There is no guarantee that respondents in a survey give their best (in statistical sense)
forecasts. They may simply give nonsense answers, or biased answers due to, for ex-
ample, strategic considerations. For instance, Laster, Bennett, and Geoum (1999) argue
that forecasters may have an incentive to publish forecasts that stand out. However, their
3argument relies on the answers being public, and the answers to the SPF survey are anony-
mous. As for the risk of nonsense answers, we believe that the appointment procedure
of the respondents, which includes a screening of the candidates, goes far in ensuring
that most of the answers, most of the time, accurately represents the respondents’ beliefs.
We also believe that it is a strength of the SPF that the forecasters are close to important
economic decision makers, since this makes it more likely that the survey reﬂects beliefs
that affect the most important pricing and investment decisions. There may still be odd or
erroneous (sloppy handwriting...) answers in the SPF data base. This is one of the reasons
why we use robust estimation methods which mitigate the problems with outliers.
A unique feature of the SPF is that it asks for probabilities (on top of the usual point
forecasts) for a few variables. In particular, since the start in 1968Q4 it asks for proba-
bilities of different intervals of (annual average) GDP deﬂator inﬂation, that is, the GDP
deﬂator for year t divided by the GDP deﬂator for year t − 1, minus one. Since 1981Q3
the survey also asks for real output growth (GNP or GDP, growth deﬁned in the same way
as for the deﬂator).1
The SPF is a quarterly survey, but we have chosen to focus mostly on the ﬁrst quar-
ters. The reason is that there are indications that the survey in the other quarters are not
comparable across years (at least not before 1981Q3) since the forecasting horizon shifted
in a non-systematic way (see Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 2000). In contrast,
the ﬁrst-quarter data is known to refer to the growth rate of the deﬂator or output from
the previous to the current year (annual average). We we later show that we get similar
results if we incorporate the “clean” data points (according to Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia, 2000) for Q2-Q4.
The inﬂation and output growth intervals (bins) for which survey respondents are
asked to give probabilities have changed over time. There is an open lower interval,
a series of interior intervals of equal width, and an open upper interval. The width of
the intervals has changed over time (1% before 1981Q3 and after 1991Q4, 2% in the
intermediate period) which may inﬂuence estimates of variance. We will take this into
account.
The results from this survey are typically reported in three ways: the median point
forecast, the dispersion of the individual point forecasts, and the aggregate (or mean) his-
1The suvey asked about the GNP deﬂator before 1992, the GDP deﬂator 1992-1995, and the (chain
weighted) GDP price index since 1996. It also asked for nominal GNP growth before 1981Q3, real GNP
growth 1981Q3-1991Q4, and real GDP growth since 1992.
4Figure 1: Aggregate inﬂation probabilities in SPF 1969-2001. This ﬁgure shows the aggregate
probabilities (vertical axis) for different inﬂation rates (horisontal axis). Estimated means are
indicated with vertical lines. Each subﬁgure shows the probabilities for two (or three) years.
tograms which are constructed by averaging the probabilities from the individual forecast-
ers’ histograms. We use these, but also measures of individual (and aggregate) uncertainty
estimated from the individual (aggregate) histograms.
As a preview of the data, Figure 1 shows the aggregate inﬂation histogram for all
ﬁrst quarters 1969-2001. The means of these “distributions” (vertical lines) follow the
well-known story about US inﬂation.
For most years, the histograms are reasonably symmetric with most of the probability
mass in interior intervals, so the SPF data seems useful for eliciting measures of uncer-
tainty. However, 1985 is a striking exception with 60% of the mass in the open lower
interval of inﬂation lower than 4%: it is clear that the placement of the survey intervals
did not keep track with the lower inﬂation after the “Volcker deﬂation.” The intervals
were adjusted only in 1985Q2. It is very difﬁcult to say anything about the moments of
5the distribution with so little information as in 1985Q1. Moreover, Federal Reserve Bank
of Philadelphia (2000) suspects that the surveys in both 1985Q1 and 1986Q1 may have
asked for the wrong forecasting horizon. We will therefore disregard these two obser-
vations in the rest of the analysis. (As a robustness check, we substituted 1985Q2 and
1986Q2 for 1985Q1 and 1986Q1, and got very similar results as without these years.)
3 Which Measure of Uncertainty?
In this section we discuss what we should take as the relevant measure of inﬂation or
output growth uncertainty. Not surprisingly, the answer depends on what we want to use
it for. There are three main candidates: disagreement among forecasters, average individ-
ual forecast error variance (or standard deviation), and the variance of SPF’s aggregate
histogram. They have all been used in previous research and macroeconomic analysis.2
Disagreement on the point forecast has the advantages of being readily available and
easy to compute. The disadvantages are also clear. This measure becomes meaningless as
the number of agents goes to one or when agents have the same information and agree on
the model to use in forecasting. In this case, the measure of uncertainty is zero as if the
economy was deterministic. One of the questions tackled in this paper is if disagreement
mirrors other measures of uncertainty that are theoretically more appealing, but less easily
available.
The average standard deviation of individual histograms does not have the drawbacks
of the ﬁrst measure. It is attractive because it is easy to associate with the uncertainty of a
representative agent. On the other hand, it sweeps disagreement under the rug. The third
measure of aggregate uncertainty is computed as the variance in the aggregate histogram.
It incorporates both individual uncertainty and disagreement.
We now set up a small model of many forecasters in order to discuss the relation
between these (and one more) measures of uncertainty. This model highlights and extends
several important results in previous work by Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987), Lahiri,
Teigland, and Zaporowski (1988), Granger and Ramanathan (1984), and others.
2Studiesthathaveusedmeasuresofuncertaintyextractedfromsurveydatatoanalyze theeffectsofinﬂa-
tion uncertainty on macroeconomic variables include Barnea, Amihud, and Lakonishok (1979), Lahiri, Tei-
gland, and Zaporowski (1988), Levi and Makin (1980), Mullineaux (1980), Bomberger and Frazer (1981),
Melvin (1982), Makin (1982, 1983), Ratti (1985), and Holland (1986, 1993).
6In this model, individual forecasters face different, but correlated, information sets
which they use to make the best possible inﬂation (or output growth) forecast. By “best”
we mean the conditional mean, which minimizes the expected squared forecasting er-
ror. For notational convenience, the information set and forecasting model of forecaster
i is summarized by a scalar signal, zi. This signal is useful for forecasting only if it is
correlated with actual inﬂation, . Let pdf.ji/ be the probability density function of
inﬂation conditional on receiving the signal of forecaster i—this should correspond to the
histogram reported by forecaster i in a given quarter (to economize on notation we sup-
press time subscripts, with the hope that the context makes it clear that we are discussing
separate distributions for each period). The mean and variance of this distribution are i
and 2
i , which can be different for different forecasters. One natural measure of inﬂation
uncertainty is the average (across forecasters) individual uncertainty, which we denote by
E.2
i /. This is the uncertainty a reader of forecasts faces if he randomly picks (and trusts)
one of the point forecasts (see, for instance, Batchelor and Dua, 1995).
Example 1 As an example, suppose  and zi have a multivariate normal distribution
with zero means (to simplify the algebra), variances s and sii, and covariance si.I n
this case, pdf.ji/ is a normal distribution with mean i D .si=sii/zi and variance
2
i D s − s2
i=sii, which is the standard least squares result.
Anyone who has access to the survey data can use the cross sectional average of the
individual forecasts, Ei,a sacombined forecast.3 If the number of forecasters goes to
inﬁnity, then all individual movements in the forecast errors are averaged out, and only the
common movements remain. It is straightforward to show (see reference above) that the
(expected) forecast error variance of an unweighted average of unbiased forecasts equals
the average covariance of individual errors.4 This must be less than the average individual
uncertainty, E.2
i /, so there is a gain from using a combined forecast as long as the indi-
vidual forecast errors are unbiased and not perfectly correlated. This theoretical argument
suggests that the mean forecast in the SPF should be assigned a smaller uncertainty than
the average individual uncertainty.
3It is well established, both in theory and practice, that an unweighted combination of several different
methods/forecasters typically reduces the forecast uncertainty. See, for instance, Granger and Ramanathan
(1984) for a general discussion of optimal combinations; and Zarnowitz (1967) and Figlewski (1983) for
applications to inﬂation data.
4With n forecasters we have Var. −
Pn
iD1i=n/ D E2
i =nCEγij.1−1=n/, where Eγij is the average
covariance of two individual forecast errors.
7Example 2 To continue the previous example, suppose that individual signals have the
same variance and covariances. It is straightforward to show that the forecast error vari-
ance of the combined forecast then simpliﬁes to E.2
i /−Var .i/, which is the individual
forecast error variance minus the cross sectional (across forecasters) variance of point
forecasts. The combined forecast is thus better than individual forecasts, especially if
forecasters disagree.
As mentioned, the SPF combines the individual histograms into aggregate (or mean)
probabilities, by taking the average (across forecasters) probability for each inﬂation in-
terval. To see how this aggregate distribution is related to individual uncertainty and
disagreement among forecasters, think of both future inﬂation and forecaster i0s signal as
random variables. Also, let pdf.i/ be the density function of receiving the signal of fore-
caster i. We then see that the aggregate distribution, pdfA./, which averages pdf.ji/




As before, let i and 2
i be the mean and variance in forecaster i’s distribution,
pdf.ji/. We know that the variance of the distribution in (1) is5
Var A./ D E.2
i / C Var.i/; (2)
so the variance of the aggregate distribution of  can be decomposed into the average of
the forecasters’ variances (average individual uncertainty) and the variance of the fore-
casters’ means (disagreement).6
It is not obvious what the aggregate distribution represents. It is less “informed” than
the individual conditional distributions (higher forecast error variance, see (2)), but it is
more informed than the unconditional distribution (when there is no signal at all) of .T o
see the latter, note that we get the unconditional distribution by integrating the distribution
once more: this time over the distribution of cross-sectional (across forecasters) means—
which is essentially the same as integrating across macroeconomic states.
An appealing, but deceptive, interpretation of the aggregate distribution is that it cap-
tures the uncertainty a reader of forecasts faces if he randomly picks (and trusts) one of
5For any random variables y and x we have Var.y/ D ETVar.yjx/UC VarTE.yjx/U, if the moments exist.
6For a different (and earlier) derivation of this decomposition, see Lahiri, Teigland, and Zaporowski
(1988).
8the point forecasts. Such a reader of forecasts may believe that he/she faces two sources
of uncertainty: which forecast to trust and then that forecast’s uncertainty. This is wrong,
however, if the individual forecaster understands that he could make a more precise fore-
cast if he had all the information of the other forecasters. Forecasters who calculate con-
ditional expectations do, so E.2
i / is the correct measure of uncertainty for this reader.
Example 3 To continue the previous example, the aggregate distribution becomes a nor-
mal distribution with mean Ei and variance Var A./ D 2
i CVar .i/. This means that
the uncertainty of the aggregate distribution and the uncertainty of the combined forecast
are symmetrically placed around average individual uncertainty.
This simple model of forecasting suggests a few things. First, individual uncertainty
seems to be a key measure of uncertainty. Second, it is hard to justify the aggregate
distribution from a forecasting perspective—unless we believe that individual forecasters
underestimate uncertainty (whether this is the case empirically is discussed in Section
5.5). The aggregate distribution could still be interesting—from an economic perspective.
The beliefs of an agent will inﬂuence his consumption and investment decisions, so the
aggregate economy is likely to be affected by some kind of average beliefs. For instance,
the asset pricing models of Varian (1985) and Benninga and Mayshar (1997) show that
if investors have logarithmic utility functions, then asset prices are directly linked to the
average (across investors) probabilities. With respect to inﬂation, this means that the
inﬂation risk premium on a nominal bond would be directly linked to SPF’s aggregate
distribution (of inﬂation). Third, care is needed when survey data on point forecasts and
forecast uncertainty is evaluated. For instance, it is hard to interpret evidence from studies
that surround the consensus point forecast with an error band derived from the aggregate
distribution.
4 Estimating Uncertainty from Survey Probabilities
This section discusses how we estimate variances from SPF’s histograms. It is always
tricky to estimate moments from a histogram, but it is even trickier in this case since the
width of SPF’s inﬂation intervals has changed over time (1% for most of the sample, but
2% 81Q3-91Q4).
9We choose to ﬁt normal distributions to each histogram: the mean and variance are es-
timated by minimizing the sum of the squared difference between the survey probabilities
and the probabilities for the same intervals implied by the normal distribution. This can
be thought of as a non-linear least squares approach where the survey probability is the
dependent variable and the interval boundaries the regressors. We have also experimented
with adding the reported point forecast to the estimation problem, but the results changed
very little.




kD1 N  .k/Pr.k/ and f Var ./ D
PK
kD1TN  .k/ −e EU2 Pr.k/; (3)
where N  .k/ and Pr.k/ are the midpoint and probability of interval k, respectively. The
lowest and highest intervals, which are open, are typically taken to be closed intervals of
the same width as the interior intervals.
The approach in (3) essentially assumes that all probability mass are located at the
interval midpoints. An alternative is to assume that the distribution is uniform within each
bin (gives same mean estimator, but the variance is increased by 1/12th of the squared
bin width). These assumptions are standard in the literature; see, for instance, Zarnowitz
and Lambros (1987), Lahiri and Teigland (1987), and Diebold, Tay, and Wallis (1998).
However, the shape of the histograms in Figure 1, which often look fairly bell shaped,
suggests that this approach overestimates the variance. It rather seems plausible that
relatively more of the probability mass within an interval is located closer to the overall
mean. This motivates our choice of ﬁtting normal distributions.
Figure 2.a shows the aggregate survey probabilities for inﬂation once again, and Fig-
ure 2.b shows the difference between the aggregate survey probabilities and the prob-
abilities implied by the ﬁtted normal distributions. The normal distributions (with two
parameters) seems to be able to ﬁt most of the intervals (6, 10, or 15 depending on period)
most of the time.
Figures 3 illustrated the effects of ﬁtting normal distributions rather than using the
crude estimator (3), by showing the estimated standard deviations of the aggregate distri-
bution of inﬂation. The crude method produces consistently higher standard deviations
with particularly volatile estimates during the 1980s when there were few and wide in-
10Figure 2: Aggregate inﬂation probabilities and estimation error. Subﬁgure a shows the aggre-
gate survey probabilities for every year 1969-2001. Subﬁgure b shows the difference between the
survey probabilities and the implied probabilities from ﬁtted normal distributions.
Figure 3: Aggregate inﬂation standard deviation estimated in two different ways. The ﬁgure
compares standard deviations obtained by ﬁtting normal distribution with those from the crude
method (3).
tervals.7 While the underlying distribution may well not be normal, we are inclined to
believe that normality provides a better approximation than all the mass at bin midpoint
7An alternative way of adjusting the crude variance, used by Ivanova and Lahiri (2000), is to apply
Sheppard’s correction; see Kendall and Stuart (1963). It amounts to subtracting 1/12 of the squared interval
width from the crude variance. For the standard deviations this means approximately 0.04 for most of the
sample, and 0.12 for 1982-1991, which would not make much impact.
11or (even worse) uniformity within bins. If this is the case, statistics obtained with the
crude method overestimate the variance and is likely to be sensitive to changes in the bin
width.8
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Time Proﬁle of Inﬂation and Output Growth Uncertainty
This section describes how U.S. inﬂation and real output growth uncertainty has changed
since the late 1960s.
Figure 4: Individual standard deviations of inﬂation and real output growth. The ﬁgure com-
pares the average individual standard deviations of inﬂation (1969-2001) and real output growth
(1982-2001).
Figure 4 shows the average individual standard deviation, E.i/, of inﬂation and out-
put growth. Inﬂation uncertainty was low before 1973 and after 1992, but fairly high in
between with peaks in the early 1970s, late 1970s, and early 1990s. For instance, a 90%
conﬁdence band constructed from a normal distribution would have been 1:6% around
the point forecast in 1982 and 0:8% in 2000. Output growth uncertainty is slightly
higher than inﬂation uncertainty, but the two series are very strongly correlated.
8To assess the sensitivity of the results to the changes in interval widths, we also reestimated the distri-
butions by using 2% intervals throughout the sample. The results are that 2% intervals give only somewhat
higher standard deviations—around 0.1 higher. This suggests that the high estimates of the standard devia-
tions during the 1980s is only partly due to the 2% intervals used by SPF at that time. In fact, none of our
main results would be affected by using 2% intervals throughout the sample.
125.2 Different Measures of Uncertainty
This section compares different measures of uncertainty The purpose is to study if the
most easily available measure of uncertainty, the degree of disagreement, is a good proxy
for theoretically more appealing measures.
Figure 5.b shows the aggregate standard deviation of inﬂation and average individual
standard deviation of inﬂation, E.i/. The aggregate standard deviation is somewhat more
volatile than the average individual standard deviation, but the two series are very highly
correlated; the correlation coefﬁcient is 0.89.







qStd.i/ 0.83 0.60 1.00
qStd.i/=StdA./ 0.40 0.02 0.79 1.00
As t a r denotes signiﬁcantly different from zero on the 5% level, us-
ing a Newey and West (1987) GMM test. The sample is 1969-2001,
excluding 1985 and 1986. StdA./ is the standard deviation of SPD’s
aggregate distribution; E.i/ is the cross-sectional average individual
standard deviation; qStd.i/ is a cross-sectional quasi-standard devi-
ation of individual point forecasts.
Figure 5.c shows the aggregate standard deviation of inﬂation and a measure of the
cross-sectional dispersion of forecasters’ point forecasts i (disagreement) of inﬂation.
This measure is a quasi-standard deviation, denoted qStd.i/, and is calculated as half
the distance between the 84th and 16th percentiles of the point forecasts. If these fore-
casts were normally distributed, then the quasi-standard deviation would coincide with
the standard deviation, otherwise it is much more robust to outliers. The ﬁgure shows that
the aggregate standard deviation and disagreement are about equally volatile and typically
move in the same direction; the correlation coefﬁcient is 0.83.
By comparing Figure 5.a and 5.b we see that disagreement and individual inﬂation
uncertainty typically move together: the correlation in Table 1 is 0.60. Individual inﬂation
uncertainty is higher than inﬂation disagreement, but the latter is more volatile. Since
they add up to aggregate inﬂation uncertainty (if squared, see (2)), we see that the level
of aggregate uncertainty is mostly due to individual uncertainty, but disagreement is the
13Figure 5: Different measures of inﬂation uncertainty. Subﬁgure a compares the standard de-
viations of the aggregate distribution with the average individual standard deviation. Subﬁgure b
compares the standard deviation of the aggregate distribution with the quasi-standard deviation of
individual point forecasts. Subﬁgure c shows a traditional standard deviation of individual point
forecasts instead of a quasi-standard deviation.
main factor behind ﬂuctuations in aggregate uncertainty.
We get similar results for output growth, although based on a smaller sample. For
instance, the correlation of disagreement and individual uncertainty is 0.44 for output
growth and 0.50 for inﬂation on the same sample (1982-2001). Similarly, the correlation
of disagreement and aggregate standard deviation is 0.75 for both output growth inﬂation.
Our conclusion is that disagreement is a fairly good proxy for other measures of uncer-
tainty that are more theoretically appealing, but less easily available. Bomberger (1996)
reaches the same conclusion based on a comparison of disagreement and ARCH mea-
14sures of the conditional variance.9 However, previous research on SPF data has found a
weaker correlation between disagreement and other measures of uncertainty (for example,
Zarnowitz and Lambros, 1987). Besides the fact that we use a longer sample, the differ-
ence is in part driven by our choice of ﬁtting normal distributions and of using a robust
measure of disagreement: if the traditional methods are used, the correlations reported
above are sizably lower, going from 0.83 to 0.68 and from 0.60 to 0.42. To illustrate this,
Figure 5.d shows that the traditional measure of disagreement (a standard deviation) is
higher and much more volatile than our robust method in 5.b.
5.3 Uncertainty and Macro Data
This section studies how uncertainty is related to recent macroeconomic data on inﬂation,
GDP growth, and the survey’s own forecast errors. We use the real-time data available at
the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (see Croushore and Stark, 2001) to get as close
as possible to the information set at the time of forecast.
Table 2 shows correlations and regression results for average individual inﬂation un-
certainty, E.i/, but similar results hold for the other measures of uncertainty. The last
column shows that SPF uncertainty is strongly positively correlated with the consensus
forecast of inﬂation and recent inﬂation, and strongly negatively correlated with recent
GDP growth. This is consistent with previous ﬁndings based on other measures of inﬂa-
tion uncertainty.10 SPF uncertainty is also positively correlated with recent uncertainty
and with the absolute value and the positive part of recent forecasting errors, which sug-
gests “ARCH/GARCH” features.
The remaining columns show multiple regressions. The ﬁrst two regressions show
that a ARCH and GARCH type models of SPF inﬂation uncertainty indeed works. This
is different from the ﬁndings of Ivanova and Lahiri (2000). One reason may be that they
essentially estimate uncertainty by the more volatile crude method (our ARCH regression
indeed turns insigniﬁcant if we use that method).
The third regression shows that recent GDP growth has no independent explanatory
power for SPF inﬂation uncertainty (the regression coefﬁcient is far from signiﬁcant),
but that inﬂation has. However, the size of the inﬂation effect is not huge: a 3 percent-
9Bomberger’s (1996) results are discussed in Rich and Butler (1998) and Bomberger (1999).
10See, among others, Levi and Makin (1980), Makin (1982), Mullineaux (1980), Grier and Perry (2000),
Evans and Wachtel (1993), and Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987).
15age point increase in inﬂation is associated with an increase of 0.12 in SPF’s average
individual standard deviation (which at the end of the sample is around 0.6). The last re-
gression shows that both the ARCH/GARCH and macro evidence continue to hold when
we include both sets of variables in the regression. However, the absolute value of recent
forecasting errors is no longer signiﬁcant at the 5% level (it is at the 6% level, though).11
Table 2: Correlation of inﬂation uncertainty and real-time macro data
Multiple regressions of Correlation
E.i/, columnwise with E.i/
Consensus point forecast 0.62
Inﬂationt−1 0.04 0.02 0.65
GDP growtht−1 -0.01 0.01 -0.45
Lag of E.i/ 0.73 0.63 0.73
Abs(forecast errort−1) 0.10 0.08 0.04 0.39
max(forecast errort−1;0) 0.24
R2 0.15 0.63 0.44 0.67 –
As t a r denotes signiﬁcantly different from zero on the 5% level (see Table 1). All
regressors are lagged onq quarter. The sample is 1969-2001, excluding 1985 and
1986. The consensus point forecast is the average individual point forecast in SPF;
Inﬂation and GDP growth are year-over-year (real-time data, as available when fore-
cast is made); the own lag is the lagged value (one year) of the variables in the column
headings; the forecast error is the actual GDP deﬂator (real-time data) inﬂation minus
the consensus forecast.
It is also interesting to see if the positive correlation of SPF inﬂation uncertainty and
inﬂation forecast holds also on the “micro level” in the sense that forecasters with high
point forecasts (relative to the median that year) are more uncertain. This correlation
ﬂuctuates substantially over time (in a non-systematic way), and is on average close to
zero (0.12). We get similar results for forecasters with extreme point forecasts (far from
the median that year, in either direction).
Uncertainty about real output growth seems to be less correlated with ARCH effects
and macro data (even controlling for the sample). However, output growth uncertainty
is certainly autocorrelated (with an autocorrelation coefﬁcient of 0.5) and high recent
inﬂation seems to increase output uncertainty (signiﬁcant on the 8% level) while recent
GDP growth does not seem to have any effect.
11Both inﬂation variables give very similar results, but including both of them in the same regression
results in high multicollinearity (low signiﬁcance). The same is true for the two “ARCH” variables.
16The use of real-time data is not particularly important for the results in this section—
revised data gives very similar results. This will change in the next section, however.
5.4 Comparison with Time Series Measures of Uncertainty
This section compares the survey uncertainty with the forecast uncertainty of some popu-
lar time series models.
We have argued that it sometimes makes sense to use a measure of uncertainty from
survey data. Unfortunately, survey data is not always available, and it is then tempting
to use a measure of uncertainty estimated with time series techniques instead. Whether
some time series methods mimic the expectations of real agents and, if so, which methods
come closer, is then a question of interest. We would also like to know whether the time
series models that come close to the SPF uncertainty are also supported by data. Starting
from a small group of often applied models (homoskedastic VAR, GARCH, asymmetric
GARCH, conditional variance as a function of past inﬂation), we would like to know
whether the models that approximate the SPF uncertainty well also are the models that
we would select on the basis of standard econometric criteria.
We choose the average individual uncertainty, E.i/, as a benchmark for comparison,
but the main conclusions extend to the other survey measures of uncertainty. This ﬁrst
model is a Vector Autoregression (VAR) with homoskedastic errors. We have strong prior
expectations that this cannot be a good model of uncertainty, since it is ﬁrmly established
that inﬂation errors are heteroskedastic, and the survey data clearly show that uncertainty
is positively correlated with the inﬂation forecast. Nevertheless, since VARs are widely
used for forecasting, it is instructive to see how bad the assumption of homoskedastic
errors is in practice. We estimate a VAR(3) on quarterly US real-time data (1955Q1-) on
GDP deﬂator inﬂation, log real GDP, the federal funds rate, and a 3-year interest rate.
The VAR is ﬁrst estimated using real-time information available to forecasters at the
time of submitting their predictions for 1969 inﬂation to SPF. A standard deviation for
the forecast error of inﬂation is produced (inﬂation is deﬁned as average deﬂator during
1969 over average deﬂator during 1968 minus one, as in the SPF). The VAR is then re-
estimated with data available in early 1970, (a “recursive” VAR) and so on. The standard
deviation of the VAR forecast changes over time because more and more data is used in
the estimation and because old data is revised. This recursive estimation procedure on
real-time data is adopted for all the models that follow, in an attempt to reproduce the
17Figure 6: Inﬂation uncertainty in survey and time series models. Subﬁgure a compares the
forecasts error standard deviations from a VAR model estimated on a longer and longer sample
with the aggregate standard deviation from SFP. Subﬁgure b compares with the average individual
standard deviation instead.
information structure available to forecasters.
Figure 6.a shows the VAR series of inﬂation standard deviations together with the
average individual inﬂation uncertainty from the survey, E.i/. The VAR uncertainty
series is much smoother than the SPF uncertainty. The correlation of the two series is
only 0.23. This result is not surprising, since in a VAR all residuals have equal weights
in forming the standard error of the forecast. A quick ﬁx for this poor performance is
to estimate the model on subsample that looks more like the current one. We therefore,
estimate a “windowed” VAR recursively on the latest fourteen years of data, so the sample
size is ﬁxed rather than progressively larger. In our case this gives rather good results, as
illustrated in 6.dV the correlation with the SPF uncertainty is 0.72, though the average level
18is clearly too low.
GARCH models are strong candidates for modelling inﬂation uncertainty. In fact,
both ARCH (Engle, 1982) and GARCH (Bollerslev, 1986) were ﬁrst applied to quarterly
inﬂation. Encouraged by the signs of GARCH effects in Section 5.3, we try several types
of GARCH models, starting with a standard GARCH(1,1).
There are reasons to believe that the standard GARCH model is not a good model
of inﬂation uncertainty, since the model implies that uncertainty is uncorrelated with the
inﬂation level and that an unforecasted fall in inﬂation produces as much uncertainty as
an unforecasted rise. In any case, we try the model since it is widely used.
We estimate a GARCH(1,1) for GDP deﬂator inﬂation in the same recursive fashion
as the VAR. The mean is modelled as an AR(4) and the sample is the same as in the VAR.
There are now three reasons for why the model standard deviation changes over time: as
fortheVARmoreandmore dataisusedanddataisrevised(parametersestimateschange),
but more importantly, the GARCH model produces time-varying standard deviations due
to lagged forecast errors. Figure 6.b shows the result. The time proﬁle is quite different
from the SPF uncertainty (the correlation is 0.41). In particular, the GARCH uncertainty
fails to capture the increase in inﬂation uncertainty around the second oil price shock and
the Volcker deﬂation. The inﬂation uncertainty from the GARCH model is also very low
on average.
An asymmetric GARCH could potentially solve the problems of the standard GARCH
model. We therefore try a T-GARCH(1,1) for inﬂation (see Zakoian, 1994). The estima-
tion results indicate that the coefﬁcient of the lagged squared error can be safely set to
zero, while the coefﬁcient of the asymmetric component is signiﬁcant and quite sizeable.
This characterization of forecast uncertainty is different from that produced by the stan-
dard GARCH: positive inﬂation surprises increase uncertainty, while negative surprises
decrease uncertainty. Figure 6.c shows the results from a recursive estimation of the T-
GARCH model. The implied inﬂation standard deviation of the forecast error is now
more correlated with the SPF uncertainty (the correlation is 0.58 compared to 0.41 for the
GARCH model). The average value is also much closer to the average SPF uncertainty.
We conclude that T-GARCH measures of uncertainty should be preferred to GARCH
measures based on both econometric testing and on their ability to approximate the SPF
uncertainty.
Section 5.3 showed that the SPF uncertainty may be almost as strongly related to
19the inﬂation level as to ARCH/GARCH effects. This suggest modelling actual inﬂation
volatility in the same way. We therefore regress the squared forecast errors (from an
AR(4)) on the average inﬂation in the previous four quarters. Figure 6.d shows the ﬁt-
ted results, transformed into a standard deviation. This series actually mimics the SPF
uncertainty better than the GARCH and T-GARCH models do (the correlation is 0.67).
Even if some of the time series models perform better than the others, all of them fail
to capture the increase in inﬂation uncertainty in the early 1980s. Our opinion is that the
large inﬂation uncertainty in the early 1980s reﬂects a regime shift (the Volcker deﬂation)
and is therefore unlikely to be picked up by any time series model in which the conditional
variance is a function of past data. Indeed, one may see this as a strong argument in favor
of using survey measures of uncertainty in period of suspected structural breaks.
The results for real output growth are fairly similar to those for inﬂation: the VAR
model fails badly (the correlation with the survey uncertainty is only 0.15) unless old data
is discarded (the “windowed” VAR has a correlation of 0.43), and both the GARCH and
T-GARCH models are clear improvements (the correlations with the survey uncertainty
are 0.72 and 0.49, respectively), but the traditional heteroskedasticity model gives a very
odd picture (the correlation with the survey uncertainty is -0.5). Unfortunately, the survey
uncertainty of real output growth is only available from 1981Q3, so it hard to say anything
about how the time series models handle clear regime changes.
The use of real-time data, as compared to revised data, improves the performance
of the GARCH, T-GARCH and “traditional heteroskedasticity” models in proxying sur-
vey uncertainty.12 However, the ranking of the models is not affected, and they all have
problems in capturing structural breaks.
5.5 Do Forecasters Underestimate Uncertainty?
The last main issue we study is if the survey uncertainty is “correct” in the sense of gen-
erating measures of uncertainty that correspond roughly to the objective uncertainty. In
particular, we are interested in studying if forecasters underestimate the objective uncer-
tainty, as is often claimed. For instance, Thaler (2000) writes
“Ask people for 90 percent conﬁdence limits for the estimates of various gen-
eral knowledge questions and the answers will lie within the limits less than
12As expected, the VAR results are not much affected, since estimates of uncertainty are less dependent
on recent data.
2070 percent of the time.”
The natural way of approaching this question is to use the survey data to construct
conﬁdence intervals around the point forecasts, and then study if the x% conﬁdence inter-
vals cover x% of the actual outcomes of GDP deﬂator inﬂation (as they should in a large
sample). Note that the question we ask involves evaluation of unconditional coverage.13
To make this operational, we assume that the forecast errors are approximately nor-
mally distributed and construct different conﬁdence bands around both individual point
forecasts and the consensus point forecast.
Table 3: Comparison of conﬁdence bands and ex post inﬂation
Conﬁdence level (x%):
Type of conﬁdence band 90% 80% 66%
Around individual point forecasts, with Std from:
i 0.72† 0.62† 0.48†




i / − Var.i/ 0.60 0.43 0.23
StdA./ 0.90 0.90 0.73
E.i/ 0.90 0.80 0.63
qStd.i/ 0.57 0.47 0.37
This table shows the fraction of years when actual inﬂation is inside the x% conﬁdence bands.
As t a r denotes signiﬁcantly different from the nominal conﬁdence level on the 5% level,
using Christoffersen’s (1998) test. A dagger † denotes that Christoffersen’s (1998) test is
done for each individual forecaster: the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% level for 34%,
21%, and 23% of the forecasters, respectively. The conﬁdence bands are calculated assuming
a normal distribution and are calculated as: mean inﬂation forecast  the critical value times
the standard deviation. Actual inﬂation is measured as the percentage change in the GDP
deﬂator (annual-average, revised data). The sample is 1969-2000, excluding 1985 and 1986.
Table 3 shows that individual forecasters underestimate uncertainty: the actual GDP
deﬂator inﬂation falls inside the 90% conﬁdence bands in only 72% of the observations
(indeed close to Thaler’s assertion).14 It is then not surprising that Christoffersen’s (1998)
13While correct unconditional coverage is necessary for optimality of the forecast distribution, it is not
sufﬁcient if the innovation process is not iid, conditional coverage being also relevant in this case. See
Christoffersen (1998) and Diebold, Tay, and Wallis (1998) for a distinction between conditional and uncon-
ditional coverage.
14To account for the fact that the number of forecasters has changed over time, we normalize the number
of forecasters to one for each year, so that each year is given the same weight in forming the average in
Table 3.
21test of correct “coverage” of the conﬁdence bands is rejected (at the 5% level) for 34% of
the forecasters (45% if we focus on forecasters who participated in the survey at least 5
years).
We get similar results for the consensus point forecast. Our theoretical forecasting
model in Section 3 suggests that the variance for the consensus point forecast should (un-
der some assumptions) be the average individual variance minus disagreement, E.2
i / −
Var.i/. Actual inﬂation falls inside such a 90% conﬁdence band only 60% of the time.
The theoretical forecasting model also shows that E.2
i / provides an upper bound on the
variance of the consensus point forecast. Only in this extreme case do the conﬁdence
bands generate the correct coverage.
ThequestionofwhetherforecastersunderestimateuncertaintyisalsoraisedbyDiebold,
Tay, and Wallis (1998), and they conclude that forecasters have overestimated uncertainty
(at least since 1980). In contrast, we ﬁnd that forecasters underestimate uncertainty: even
on the subsample 1982-2000, we ﬁnd that the coverage ratio of individual 90% conﬁdence
bands is less than 80%.
The main explanation for the difference is that Diebold, Tay, and Wallis (1998) use
the aggregate histogram, which corresponds to the line in Table 3 where we surround the
consensus point forecast by a conﬁdence band based on StdA./ (which actually have
a 100% coverage over the subsample 1982-2000). This combines the best forecast with
the widest conﬁdence intervals—which ought to give a high coverage. Rather, the simple
forecasting model in Section 3 suggests that the consensus forecast should be assigned
a much smaller uncertainty. It seems to us that the best way of tackling the question of
whether forecasters underestimate uncertainty is to use the individual distributions, as we
do in the ﬁrst row of Table 3.
A simple example illustrates the point. Suppose that the sample consists of two fore-
casters, andthatthetruedistribution ofinﬂationisuniform between0and2. Alsosuppose
that the ﬁrst forecaster reports a uniform distribution between 0 and 1, and the second a
uniform between 1 and 2—so both forecasters indeed underestimate uncertainty. Using
the methodology in Diebold, Tay, and Wallis (1998), we would build the aggregate his-
togram, which is uniform between 0 and 2, and thus conclude that the survey distribution
is optimal. However, using our approach we would conclude that only half of the individ-
ual forecasts are inside the 90% percent error bands.
22The results for real output growth are even stronger than for inﬂation: actual output
growth falls inside the individual 90% bands only 51% of the times (80% for inﬂation),
and it falls inside the 90% conﬁdence band around the consensus point forecast (with
“combined” standard deviation) only 29% of the times.
Our results suggest that forecasters underestimate the actual inﬂation uncertainty.
There are several caveats, however. First, it is possible that the results are driven by
small sample problems, for instance, in the point forecast used as the mid-point of the
conﬁdence intervals. We do not believe that this alone can account for the result. It is true
that most forecasters missed the inﬂation surges in 1969 and 1973-1974, but the results
go through even if we disregard these episodes. Second, the forecast errors could be very
far from normal. Once again, we do not believe that this is strong enough to overturn the
results. The evidence of non-normality is mixed, and perhaps more importantly, some of
the numbers in the table actually violate Chebyshev’s inequality—so the fraction inside
the band is too low (according to the point estimate, at least) for any distribution (with
ﬁnite variance).15
If it is true that forecasters underestimate the true uncertainty, how should we then use
the survey data? In many cases, it is probably the actual beliefs of economic agents that
matter, for instance, for understanding investment decisions, asset pricing, and price/wage
setting(includingmonetarypolicycredibility). However, fromapureforecastingperspec-
tive, it may be reasonable to adjust the numbers. The last three lines in Table 3 therefore
give results for the consensus point forecast, but using the other survey measures of un-
certainty. The results indicate that both the aggregate standard deviation, StdA./,a n d
the mean individual uncertainty, E.i/, work fairly well, while the disagreement across
forecasters, qStd.i/, generates too narrow conﬁdence intervals.
5.6 Different Quarters
This section demonstrates that the results for the ﬁrst quarters (which we have reported
above) hold also for the other quarters.
Figure 7 compares the average individual inﬂation standard deviation, E.i/, for dif-
ferent quarters. All data points with inconsistent handling of the forecasting horizon in
15Chebyshev’s inequality says that Pr.jx −ExjC/ 1=C2 where  is the (ﬁnite) standard deviation
of x. For instance, the 90% conﬁdence level in Table 3 uses C D 1:645, so the probability of being inside
the band is at least 0.63. This is violated by the “Combined Std.”
23SPF (see Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 2000) are set to missing values—this
affects mostly the fourth quarter. There are still a few data points that appear suspect, for
instance 1969Q3.
Figure 7: Individual inﬂation uncertainty in different quarters. These ﬁgures compares av-
erage individual inﬂation uncertainty in different quarters. The forecast is for the calendar year
inﬂation (annual average). The numbers in parentheses (legend) are correlations with Q1.
Theforecastersareaskedtosupplyforecastsandhistogramsforcalendaryearinﬂation
(average deﬂator level in year t divided by the average deﬂator level in year t − 1). This
means that the forecasting horizon is shorter for later quarters, so their standard deviations
should (on average) be lower—and this is also what the ﬁgures show.
It is also clear that the standard deviations are highly correlated across quarters (cor-
relations with Q1 are in parentheses). This shows that the ﬁrst quarters capture the main
movements in uncertainty over time, so we should expect Q2-Q4 to deliver the same kind
of results. This is indeed the case; we summarize the main ﬁndings below.
The correlations of different measures of uncertainty are fairly similar across quarters.
For instance, the correlation between disagreement and individual uncertainty is 0.60 for
Q1 (see Table 1), 0.68 for Q2, and 0.54 for Q3 and 0.46 for Q4.
The correlations with “ARCH proxies” are also similar across quarters, but later quar-
ters have somewhat lower correlations with inﬂation and GDP growth. For instance, the
correlation of individual uncertainty and lagged inﬂation is 0.65 for Q1 (see Table 2), but
0.41-0.47 for Q2-Q4.
The correlations with the results from time series models are very similar for Q1-Q3,
24but Q4 appears to be more correlated with all time series models. This reﬂects the fact
that all these models look more similar to the survey uncertainty in the second half of the
sample, which is the period for which survey uncertainty for Q4 is available.
The coverage ratios of individual conﬁdence bands are fairly similar across quarters.
For instance, for Q1 the 90% conﬁdence bands cover 72% of the deﬂator inﬂation out-
comes (see Table 3), for Q2 and Q3 it is around 66%, and for Q4 only 56%.
6 Summary
This paper studies the uncertainty about U.S. inﬂation and real output growth reported by
the participants of the Survey of Professional Forecasters 1969-2001. We compare differ-
ent measures of uncertainty (average individual uncertainty, disagreement about the point
forecast, etc), analyze how uncertainty is related to real-time macro data and time series
measures of volatility, and to examine if forecasters underestimate actual uncertainty.
Extracting a measure of uncertainty from survey data is not an easy task, however,
and several pitfalls need to be discovered and circumvented. We use a simple theoreti-
cal forecasting/asset pricing model to help us understand the relation between different
measures of uncertainty, and how forecasters perception of uncertainty can be evaluated.
We also apply improved estimation techniques which handle the discrete nature of the
data (histograms) as well as extreme outliers. Our estimates of inﬂation uncertainty are
therefore much less volatile than in previous studies.
We obtain several interesting results:
- First, disagreement on the point forecast is readily available, and therefore often
used as an indicator of uncertainty. Although other measures of uncertainty may be
more theoretically appealing, we ﬁnd that our different measures of inﬂation and
output growth uncertainty are highly correlated, so (changes in) disagreement can
serve as reasonable proxy for (changes in) uncertainty.
- Second, the survey inﬂation uncertainty is positively related to recent inﬂation and
inﬂation forecast errors, and contains a large portion of inertia (autocorrelation).
- Third, commonlyappliedtimeseriesmodels(VAR,GARCH,asymmetricGARCH)
have problems with giving even approximately the same time proﬁle of inﬂation un-
certainty as the survey. A VAR re-estimated on recent data only, or a model where
25inﬂation volatility is regressed on the recent inﬂation level actually perform better.
However, all these econometric models have problems with capturing the changes
in the survey uncertainty around the Volcker deﬂation in early 1980s.
- Fourth, and ﬁnally, forecasters seem to underestimate uncertainty, since actual in-
ﬂation and output growth fall inside their conﬁdence bands much too seldom.
A Appendix: Data
This appendix presents the data sources.
The GNP/GDP deﬂator and GDP (chain weighted) price series are from the Bureau of
EconomicAnalysis(availableathttp://www.bea.doc.gov/). TheFederalfundsrateandthe
3-years Treasury Note rate (constant maturity) are aggregated to quarterly from monthly
databytakingtheaverageofthedataatFRED(availableathttp://www.stls.frb.org/fred/data).
The real-time macro data and the data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters is
available from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (http://www.phil.frb.org/).
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